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Abstract
Recent research on ultimatum bargaining, the fact that children often confront and use
ultimatums, and theories of developmental psychology all combine to suggest that studying
children's ultimatum behavior will be particularly enlightening, both theoretically and with
respect to the development of bargaining behavior. The results from two experiments indicate
that younger children made larger oers and accepted smaller oers than older participants.
Boys took greater strategic advantage of asymmetric information than girls; this dichotomy
began with nine-year-olds (third graders) and continued for twelve- and ®fteen-year-olds (sixth
and ninth graders) as well as for college students. Like adults, children accepted smaller oers
when they did not know how much was being divided. Older children required increasingly
higher oers, except for college students who were willing to accept considerably less than
others. Also, some of the nine-year-olds displayed an extremely strong sense of fairness. The
discussion focuses on the development of bargaining strategies and concerns for fair-
ness. Ó 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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Fairness and exchange are typical aspects of everyday interpersonal in-
teraction. When encounters intensify and become de®ned as negotiations,
ultimatums become a possible (and sometimes probable) end-game strategy.
Recent empirical work in experimental economics has focused considerable
attention on the dynamics of ultimatum bargaining; results suggest that a
forceful economic prediction derived from models of subgame-perfect equi-
libria (Selten, 1965) cannot explain a remarkably consistent set of ®ndings.
Instead, concerns for fairness are often suggested as an explanation for the
results (e.g., Gu Èth and Tietz, 1990).
Although issues surrounding fairness have a long history (e.g., see Plato's
Republic), we are not aware of any literature that documents a seemingly
fundamental question about fairness and bargaining, that is, how children
incorporate issues of fairness in their negotiations. Given anecdotal evidence
that young children commonly experience ultimatums and other threats
(from their parents, siblings, and peers; Murnighan, 1991), ultimatums ap-
pear to be a natural bargaining task for studying age-related behaviors in
negotiations. In addition, the literature on the development of fairness con-
cerns can be applied directly to these issues.
Thus, this paper presents a ®rst attempt to study the ultimatum bar-
gaining strategies of both children and adults and represents, in part, a
reaction to the surprising absence in the empirical research literature on
children's bargaining behaviors and the development of bargaining strate-
gies. This study is an attempt to understand one important area ± bar-
gaining ± of ``the economic world that children are constructing
themselves'' (Lea et al., 1987, p. 398). It also takes an approach that ad-
dresses how children understand and try to solve economic problems
(Webley and Lea, 1993, p. 463). As a ®rst step in this endeavor, we
combine models of children's perceptions of distributive justice (e.g., Da-
mon, 1980) with theories of rational choice to generate hypotheses about
children's and adults' ultimatum bargaining behavior. Fairness and income
maximization provide markedly dierent outlooks on this most basic of
bargaining interactions. Speci®cally, this paper focuses on the formation
and resolution of ultimatums by kindergartners (5- and 6-year-olds), third
graders (9-year-olds), sixth graders (12-year-olds), ninth graders (15-year-
olds), and third year college students (20- to 22-year-olds), as framed by
economic, social psychological, and developmental theories of fairness and
negotiation.
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By boiling a negotiation down to its most basic, ®nal event, an ultimatum
represents the essence of the endgame in competitive two-party bargaining.
In its barest form, as studied here, an ultimatum represents the simplest of
negotiations: one person makes an oer; the other can accept it or reject it.
An acceptance seals the deal, in the terms proposed by the oerer. A rejection
means that both parties receive nothing from the interaction. Unlike many
real world negotiations, experiments on ultimatums have generally not al-
lowed ®nal oers to be changed: they are true ultimatums.
Models of subgame-perfect equilibria (Selten, 1965; Stahl, 1972) predict
that people will accept any ultimatum oer that is greater than zero (i.e.,
something is better than nothing). Working backward from the respondent's
choices (which in this case are restricted to simply accepting or rejecting an
oer) suggests that oerers need not oer much, since rejecting would give
respondents a zero payo. The theory fails to predict the often-repeated
observations that (1) people oer more than small amounts (often as much as
half) and (2) many people reject oers that are greater than zero (e.g., Roth et
al., 1991).
Indeed, the subgame-perfect model's predictions and experimental obser-
vations show little relationship to one another in typical ultimatum games
(e.g., Ochs and Roth, 1989; Roth, 1995). Adults' oers, in a variety of studies,
settings, and countries (e.g., Gu Èth et al., 1982; Gu Èth and Tietz, 1987; Neelin
et al., 1988; Ochs and Roth, 1989; Roth et al., 1991) have averaged between
40% and 50% of the amount to be divided ± much larger than predicted.
Reasons proposed for unpredicted large oers have focused on oerers'
concerns for fairness (Straub and Murnighan, 1995) or their expectations
that respondents may reject small oers (Harrison and McCabe, 1992).
Reasons proposed for the unpredicted rejections of small oers have included
that: (a) respondents may require some minimum oer, below which they will
reject everything (Ochs and Roth, 1989); (b) respondents' concerns for fair-
ness lead them to resist small, unfair oers (Gu Èth and Tietz, 1990); or (c)
small oers wound a respondent's pride and generate spiteful rejections
(Straub and Murnighan, 1995).
Straub and Murnighan (1995) addressed several of these issues in two
experiments which included standard conditions of complete information,
where both oerers and respondents knew how much was being divided, and
partial information conditions, where respondents did not know how much
was being divided. Results indicated that, as before, many respondents who
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did not know how much was being divided, however, accepted and were
willing to accept much smaller oers (as they have in studies by Kagel et al.,
1992, and Croson, 1993), indicating that they did not have some minimally
acceptable oer. In fact, people reported being willing to accept such small
oers (if oerers would make them) that the subgame-perfect predictions for
respondents were ®nally supported, but only in the partial information
conditions.
Oers, however, consistently exceeded predictions in both the complete and
partial information conditions. In fact, most participants oered signi®cantly
more in the complete information conditions than they did in the partial in-
formation conditions: they took advantage of respondents' lack of informa-
tion and shaded their oers (oering less) when respondents did not know
how much they were dividing. Straub and Murnighan (1995) operationally
de®ned this behavior as strategic rather than fair (which was operationally
de®ned as oering the same amount in both information conditions), sug-
gesting, as have other studies (e.g., Harrison and McCabe, 1992; Kahn and
Murnighan, 1993), that people raise their oers to avoid potential rejections
rather than to be fair to respondents. Recent research (Pillutla and Mur-
nighan, 1995) extends this conclusion, showing that oerers are exploitative as
well as strategic, since they reduced the size of their oers when they could add
``This is fair'' labels to them before submitting them to respondents.
1.2. Children's approaches to fairness
The research related to children's bargaining has focused primarily on
children's allocation norms (e.g., Streater and Chertko, 1976) or their
competitiveness in matrix games (e.g., Toda et al., 1978). Studies of the de-
velopment of expressions of self-interest and fairness have repeatedly relied
on a procedure derived from the study of equity models in adults (e.g.,
Adams, 1963). After two children performed a task, one of them divided a
reward. Most designs incorporated false feedback that one child's perfor-
mance was either equal to or better than the other's. Since this information
was provided to both children, it established a basis for dierential percep-
tions of deservingness and dierent allocation norms. Researchers then cat-
egorized actual allocations as re¯ecting norms of equality, equity (i.e.,
outcomes that were proportional to performance dierences), or some
combination of the two (e.g., ordinal equity, where the better performer got
more, but not proportionally more, than the poorer performer). Lerner
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self-interest and the preferred allocation norm. His ``third party'' procedure
asked child allocators to divide the payo between two other children with
known performance achievements. A ®nal variation (Morgan and Sawyer,
1967; Streater and Chertko, 1976) allowed performers to actually negotiate
their allocations face-to-face.
The results are consistent with the early stages of the six stage model of
moral development by Kohlberg (1976), where children progress from self-
interested rule following to understanding that others have needs to con-
forming to the Golden Rule. In all three methodological variations, the
®ndings show that younger children are own-gain oriented (e.g., Keil, 1986;
McClintock et al., 1977). Wide disparities in performance often led to allo-
cations based on ordinal equity, which gives more to the better performer,
but not enough to match the dierential performance ratio (Keil and
McClintock, 1983). In addition, fair allocations (proportional or ordinal
equity or equality) by self-interested allocators increased with age (e.g., van
Avermaet and McClintock, 1988).
The model of social reasoning by Damon (1980) also re¯ects these ®ndings,
with children (a) being primarily self-interested prior to ®ve years of age, (b)
focusing on equality as a way to prevent con¯ict from 5 to 7 years of age, and
(c) beginning to think in terms of equity thereafter. In contrast to these pre-
dictions, Handlon and Gross (1959) found that kindergartners (5- and 6-year-
olds) were much more likely to keep a majority of the prize than 4th, 5th, or
6thgraders(10-to12-year-olds),whoweremostlikelytosplititequally.Hook
and Cook (1979) suggested that children's increasing use of proportional
equitymatchesincreasesintheirabilitytocalculateandapplyproportionality.
Research also shows that children become increasingly competitive with
age across several cultural groups (e.g., Kagan and Madsen, 1972; Toda et
al., 1978). Taken together, these results revise the early observations of Piaget
(1965): not only may concerns for equality peak early, but concerns for and
the ability to calculate equity, along with competitive behavior, appear to
increase with age.
In the ultimatum bargaining task, however, oerers have no substantive
claim for their more powerful position: they have really done nothing to
achieve their role as oerer. Thus, equity concerns in the context of ultima-
tums may be conceptualized as equality.
Operationally, our research follows Straub and Murnighan (1995) and
de®nes 50±50 oers as perfectly fair. The developmental literature we have
reviewed suggests that perfectly fair, equal oers will be most likely for
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old category where pushes for equality are strongest. As children get older,
their ability to calculate proportionality may also lead to a departure from
equality. This depends on whether they acclimate quickly to the role (and the
power) of the oerer, as adults seem to do. Thus, we predict that perfect
fairness will be most frequent for the youngest children in our studies and
tentatively predict that strategic behavior will increase with age.
Hypothesis 1. Younger children will make more equal, 50±50 oers than older
children.
Hypothesis 2. Older children will be increasingly strategic as oerers. That is,
older oerers will shade (reduce) their oers more and more frequently when
respondents do not know how much is being divided.
Previous research on generosity, however, suggests that children become
more generous as they get older (e.g., Zarbatany et al., 1985) and that girls
are more generous than boys. Thus, if children view the oerer's role as an
opportunity to be generous, they may oer more. This provides a contrasting
hypothesis and a gender-based hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1a. Older children will make larger, more generous oers than
younger children.
Hypothesis 3. Girls will make larger ultimatum oers than boys.
Finally, with respect to their behavior as respondents, a wealth of research
(e.g., Mischel and Metzner, 1962) suggests that younger children have a much
harder time delaying or refusing grati®cation than older children. Thus,
Hypothesis 4. Younger children will accept smaller oers than older children.
Previous results for adults showed that they accepted less as respondents
when they did not know how much was being divided. There seems to be
little reason for predicting dierent results across dierent age groups. Thus,
the ®nal hypothesis is a replication prediction.
Hypothesis 5. Respondents will accept smaller oers when they do not know
how much is being divided than they will when they do know how much is
being divided.
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children who were enrolled in kindergarten (5- and 6-year-olds), third grade
(9-year-olds), and sixth grade (12-year-olds). Unlike previous studies with
adults, who could make repeated ultimatum oers and responses in a ques-
tionnaire, younger children needed individual instructions to understand and
respond to the task. Study 2 used more standard methods and includes sixth
and ninth graders (15-year-olds); results from college students reported by
Straub and Murnighan (1995) were included for comparison. Sixth graders





Forty-seven children in two kindergarten classes and 40 children in two
third grade classes at an elementary school in Champaign, Illinois, and 35
children in the sixth grade classes from the junior high school in Mahomet,
Illinois participated in this experiment. Champaign is a university town of
about 65,000 people; Mahomet is a rural suburb of Champaign. The kin-
dergartners and third graders represented a mix of racial and socioeconomic
backgrounds; sixth graders were primarily Caucasian from a mix of rural and
suburban homes.
2.1.2. Procedures and design
We used a face-to-face, one-on-one procedure to ensure that the children
would understand the task. Three experimenters (the authors and a female
associate) asked each child to make a series of choices in the hallway outside
their school classroom. Each child made take-it-or-leave-it oers of money
and M&Ms (small, sugar-coated chocolate candies that are popular among
American children) and responded to another unidenti®ed child's take-it-or-
leave-it oers of money and M&Ms. Half of the participants made oers ®rst;
half responded to oers ®rst. As respondents, children were told to imagine
another child who had an amount of money (unspeci®ed or $1) or a number
of M&Ms (unspeci®ed or 10). This other child had to oer them some of it.
If they accepted, they were to imagine that they would receive what they
were oered and the other child would get what was left. If they rejected the
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received nothing.
In the partial information conditions (which always preceded comparable
complete information conditions), they were told that they would not know
how much the other child was dividing. The experimenter sequentially dis-
played oers of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 25, and 50 cents, in that order, or from 1 to 10
M&Ms, one at a time, on the table in front of them, and asked whether they
would accept or reject each oer. Participants always responded to coin oers
before M&M oers since pilot testing suggested that the appearance of
M&Ms prior to coins seriously impeded younger children's ability to con-
centrate when they were asked to switch to coins. Oers were discontinued
when they had accepted three consecutively.
Prior to implementing the experimental procedures, the experimenters
asked kindergartners and third graders whether they could identify and
dierentiate dierent coins. All of the third graders knew the dierences
between and the values of a penny, nickel, dime, and quarter (respectively 1,
5, 10 and 25 cents). Kindergartners understood the value of a penny, but
often confused the remaining coins. Thus, the results for kindergartners' coin
oers were not included in the quantitative analyses; we use their choices for
coins only in our description of the qualitative ®ndings.
As oerers in the face-to-face procedure, children formulated ultimatums
dividingmoney®rstandM&Mssecond.Theymadepartialinformationoers,
dividing$1(2quarters,2dimes,4nickels,and10pennies),beforedividing4,5,
10, and 11 M&Ms (small and large amounts of an even and an odd number of
M&Ms), before making complete information oers using the same amounts.
During the experiment, the complete or partial information nature of the sit-
uation was frequently reemphasized. The experimenters often asked children
why they had chosen a particular action. All interactions were tape recorded.
The design included a number of factors, including grades (kindergarten,
3rd, and 6th), gender, information (complete and partial), amounts for
M&M oers (4, 5, 10, and 11), order (oers or responses ®rst), and experi-
menters. For monetary oers, the design included only two grade levels (3rd
and 6th grades); kindergartners were excluded from these analyses. For
M&M oers, all three grades and four amounts were included in the design.
Analysis of responses to oers included all three grades as well as gender and
information. Order and experimenters were included in preliminary analyses
to test for potentially biasing eects.
Teachers and administrators at the schools required that the children not
be provided any direct compensation (i.e., either money or M&Ms); they
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this was not as desirable as providing them with real outcomes, the children
responded with considerable interest and involvement in the task. Also, al-
though debate about the value of tangible incentives continues (Roth, 1995),
Thaler (1987) reviewed several studies showing no dierences in eects for
real and hypothetical payments and concluded that experiments that did not
include ®nancial incentives still provided important data. In the current
studies, each kindergarten and third grade class received a $50 gift for the
students' participation. The junior high school received a $200 contribution
to their general fund for the sixth graders' participation. Children were given
this information if they asked. A report of the results of the study were
provided to the children's instructors and principals with an oer to present
and discuss the results with their classes.
Research has recently raised the possibility that a lack of anonymity may
lead to increases in oer sizes. Homan et al. (1994) found that, in dictator
games, anonymity increased the amount of money dictators claimed. Bolton
and Zwick (1995), however, report data showing that the eects of anonymity
in ultimatum games are considerably less severe. In this study, the use of a
face-to-face procedure may have boosted the size of the children's oers; this
eect, however, is likely to be consistent across conditions. Given the need to
insure that the children understood the procedures, more anonymous pro-
cedures were not feasible.
2.1.3. Dependent variables and analyses
The primary dependent variables for oerers were the value of their coin
and M&M oers. For respondents, it was their lowest acceptable oers for
coins and M&Ms. Oerers were also operationally de®ned as strategic, fair,
or perfectly fair (Straub and Murnighan, 1995). Oerers were de®ned as fair
when they made identical oers in the complete and partial information
conditions. Perfectly fair oers, in addition, were always 50±50. Strategic
oerers shaded, oering less in the partial than in the complete information
conditions. In the few cases when partial information oers exceeded com-
plete information oers, they were classi®ed as fair.
The observed distributions of oers and responses in both information
conditions did not satisfy the assumptions of normality or homogeneity of
variance for ANOVA; the data also did not satisfy the sphericity assumptions
of the mixed-model approach to within-subjects analyses. However, between-
subjects ANOVAs are robust with respect to departures from the normality
and homogeneity assumptions (Maxwell and Delaney, 1990). Moreover, the
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and is robust with respect to departures from normality. Therefore, all
within-subjects analyses used the multivariate approach.
ANOVAs of M&M oers and lowest acceptable oers (responses) for
coins and M&Ms included two between subjects factors, grades (kindergar-
ten, third, and sixth) and gender (boys and girls), and two repeated factors,
information (partial and complete) and amounts (4, 5, 10, and 11 for
M&Ms). Since kindergartners did not understand the value of dierent coins,
their responses were not included in a similar analysis of coin oers. Note
that we use grades rather than age as a factor since grades (kindergarten,
third, sixth) are quite distinct in our sample even though age may have varied
somewhat within each grade.
We also present a series of qualitative observations. Finally, since con-
sistency is one hallmark of rational behavior (Bazerman, 1994), we measured
the consistency of participants' behavior across and within their roles as
oerers and respondents. In particular, correlations identi®ed: (1) whether
children were consistent (generous or stingy) oerers for the two commodities
(money and candy); (2) whether they consistently accepted (or rejected) the
oers they received; and (3) whether their oers were related to their re-
sponses, i.e., they were willing to make and accept small (or large) oers.
2.2. Results
The results are presented in three stages: (1) order and experimenter eects;
(2) overall analyses, tests of the hypotheses, and data on age-related bar-
gaining behaviors and strategies; and (3) qualitative and correlational ®nd-
ings. Non-signi®cant eects and results that are not pertinent to either the
hypotheses or developmental processes are not reported but are available
from the authors.
Tests of experimenter and order eects yielded only one signi®cant eect,
indicating that third grade respondents in the face-to-face procedure had
more moderate lowest acceptable coin oers [F(2,29)4.44, p < 0.05] for
the second author (means of 4.5 and 6.2 cents for the partial and complete
information conditions; n25) than for the other two experimenters (means
of 1.8 and 18.7 cents, respectively; n's5 and 10). Given the large number of
possible eects for experimenters (24 across the dierent conditions and de-
pendent variables), odds were good that one would be signi®cant. Thus, we
felt justi®ed in pooling the data over experimenters and order, especially since
the largest of the experimenter conditions yielded the most moderate results.
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Signi®cant eects for the third and sixth graders' monetary oers included
grade [F(1,60)20.92, p < 0.01], information [F(1,60)12.54, p < 0.01],
and gender ´ information [F(1,60)6.35, p < 0.02]. Overall, third graders
oered signi®cantly less than sixth graders (32.54 versus 47.58 cents); average
oers were signi®cantly higher (42.25 versus 37.35 cents) when the amount to
be divided was complete rather than partial information. The interaction
indicated that females shaded their oers only moderately (on average, from
42.32 in the complete information condition to 40.42 cents in the partial)
while males shaded more (averages of 42.18 and 34.27 cents). The signi®cant
interaction clearly resulted from the boys' relatively small partial information
oers.
Frequency counts for the number of fair, perfectly fair, and strategic
monetary oerers, however, indicated that girls were only slightly more often
categorized as fair (n17) than they were as strategic (n14) and that third
grade boys tended to be strategic (16 of 21) while sixth grade boys tended to
be perfectly fair (15 of 23). Thus, the means and medians are slightly de-
ceptive, and the conclusion that boys were generally strategic while girls were
generally fair is more true, in this sample, for third than for sixth graders. It
also suggests that when girls made strategic oers, they shaded their partial
information oers less than boys did, and that sixth grade boys who did
shade their oers shaded them a lot.
For M&M oers, the only signi®cant eect was a grade ´ gender ´ amount
interaction [F(6,276)2.81, p < 0.02] which indicated that, while the median
oer for oerers dividing 4 and 10 M&Ms was typically 2 and 5, respectively,
girls tended to oer more than half (3 and 6) while boys oered less than half
(2 and 5) when they were dividing 5 and 11 M&Ms.
2.2.2. Responses
The only signi®cant eect for responses to monetary ultimatums was a
main eect for information [F(1,60)17.73, p < 0.001]. As in previous
studies with adults, children were willing to take signi®cantly less (on av-
erage, 4.65 cents) when they did not know how much was being divided
than when they did (10.65 cents). The analysis of children's responses to
M&M oers yielded no signi®cant eects that were pertinent to the hy-
potheses.
Analysis of the frequency of acceptances of one penny and one M&M
indicated that kindergartners accepted oers of one penny or one M&M
more than third and sixth graders, [F(2,120)3.70, p < 0.03]: they accepted
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27% and 27% for third graders and 40% and 62% for sixth graders, sup-
porting Hypothesis 4. Overall, respondents accepted one M&M more fre-
quently than one penny, [F(1,120)9.95, p < 0.005].
2.2.3. Qualitative and correlational results
There were three noteworthy qualitative ®ndings. Although many kin-
dergartners did not understand the value of the dierent coins, they made a
rough quantitative division of the coins when they were making oers.
Many simply separated the pile of coins into two approximately equal
groups and shoved one across the table as their oer. More importantly,
approximately 12% of the kindergartners gave the other child all of the
coins and all of the M&Ms. We did not see this behavior in any other
group.
Second, more than half of the third graders who were dividing 4, 5, 10, and
11 M&Ms oered 2, 3, 5, and 6 (or some slight variation of this pattern) in
both the complete and partial information conditions. When they were di-
viding 5 or 11 M&Ms, many asked whether they could cut one in half. As
noted, girls were more likely to oer the odd M&M; boys were more likely to
keep it.
In addition, when they responded to M&M oers from another child and
they knew that 10 M&Ms were being divided (the complete information
condition), 13 of the 40 third graders (35.5%; six boys and seven girls) re-
jected 1, 2, 3, and 4, accepted 5, and rejected 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. A lack of
fairness, for them or for the other child, was the reason given for rejecting
unequal oers.
We checked whether participants were consistent by converting oers
and minimally acceptable oers (responses) to percentages of the amount
oered, and calculating intercorrelations between and among their oers
and their responses. Children were consistent respondents to M&M and
monetary oers; their responses were highly correlated (3 of 4 coecients
were signi®cant; 0.106r's60.49, p < 0.05). They were also consistent of-
ferers: correlations among monetary oers and among M&M oers were
signi®cant in 28 of 29 instances; correlations between monetary and M&M
oers led to 9 of 16 signi®cant correlations. No signi®cant correlations (out
of 20) resulted, however, between responses and oers. Thus, children
tended to be internally consistent as oerers or as respondents, but they
were not consistent when they shifted from being respondents to oerers or
vice versa.
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The data from Study 1 provide mixed support for the hypotheses. Hy-
pothesis 5, that respondents would accept less when they did not know how
much was being divided, was clearly supported for monetary oers. Thus, the
current ®ndings were consistent with those for adults.
Hypothesis 4 suggested that younger children would accept smaller oers
than older children. Kindergartners accepted oers of a single penny or
M&M more often than the older children in this sample. But third graders'
frequent use of a stringent criterion for fairness, which led to many rejections,
runs counter to the hypothesis. Overall, support is mixed.
Hypothesis 3 was primarily supported: girls did tend to oer more than
boys. They did so particularly when they divided an odd number of M&Ms
(5 or 11) and when the respondent did not know how much money they were
dividing (the partial information conditions), where, unlike the boys, they
shaded their oers only slightly.
Hypothesis 2 suggested that older oerers would be increasingly strategic.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that younger children would be perfectly fair more
than older children; Hypothesis 1a suggested that younger children would
not be as generous as older children. The data are not consistent for any of
these hypotheses. Third graders shaded more than kindergartners. However,
sixth graders were more often fair than strategic, supporting the notion that
older oerers were more generous. But kindergartners were the only oerers
to oer everything. Their intentions never seemed strategic; when they did
not oer half, the size of their oer seemed to be based more on an inability
to calculate what was exactly half than anything else.
3. Study 2
Study 1 investigated the bargaining behavior of young children in a sim-
pli®ed, face-to-face procedure. Study 2 extends this research to older chil-
dren, 6th and 9th graders who average 12 and 15 years of age, respectively,
and compares their responses to young adults (college students) using stan-
dard response formats that increase participants' anonymity. Rather than
responding one-on-one with an experimenter, respondents in Study 2 com-
pleted written questionnaires anonymously. By extending the age of the
children we studied, we provide a more complete picture of the changes and
development of bargaining behavior from younger children to adults.
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3.1.1. Participants
Sixty additional students from the same sixth grade classes participated in
this experiment, along with 58 students from three ninth grade classes from
the high school in Urbana, Illinois, and 145 students from three under-
graduate classes at the University of Illinois. Urbana is Champaign's sister
city (they are not separated geographically) and has approximately 35,000
residents; the ninth graders represented a mix of racial and socioeconomic
backgrounds. As noted, the sixth graders were primarily Caucasian from a
mix of rural and suburban homes. The undergraduate population at the
University of Illinois primarily draws middle and upper middle class students
from the city of Chicago and the state of Illinois; the students in this study
were enrolled in an introductory management class designed primarily for
third year students (20 years of age, occasionally older).
3.1.2. Procedures
All participants responded to a paper-and-pencil questionnaire to ensure
that their responses were comparable to those from previous research. The
questionnaire asked them to ®rst act as ultimatum respondents and then as
ultimatum oerers. (Some of the college students, as noted below, only acted
as respondents, and none responded to or made ultimatums with M&Ms as
prizes.) Sixth and ninth graders' questionnaires began with eight ``no strings
attached'' oers, where respondents were simply oered amounts of money
(ranging from 1 cent to $5) that they could accept or reject. The instructions
emphasized that their responses would not aect any other person. (Tech-
nically, of course, this cannot be true: any winnings had to come from
somewhere. But we tried to diuse the source and, if asked, emphasized that
no other individual provided these funds.) They were also asked the lowest
amount they would accept in this and each of the following conditions. The
``no strings'' condition was included to determine just how low their smallest
acceptable oers might go.
Participants then responded to oers, ®rst without knowing how much was
being divided (partial information) and then when they did (complete in-
formation). Both sets of oers were in the same range as those from the no
strings attached condition, but with slightly dierent values, to reduce sus-
picion. Oerers ostensibly divided 10 M&Ms and monetary amounts ranging
from $1 to $1 million. Participants knew these amounts in the complete in-
formation condition. They also knew that amounts of $100 or more were
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however, were included in a lottery, described below, that determined their
potential payos.
Participants then made their own ultimatum oers, ®rst when they knew
that respondents did not know how much was being divided, and then when
the amount was shared (complete) information. They divided 4, 5, 10, and 11
M&Ms and monetary amounts ranging from $1 to $1 million.
The college students responded to a similar series of questions. Two
classrooms totalling 94 students responded to the no strings, partial, and
complete information monetary oers but did not formulate oers. One other
classroom of 51 college students participated in a dierent experiment and
responded to and made all of the monetary oers but did not respond to no
strings oers.
3.1.3. Dependent variables and analyses
The dependent variables and analyses were similar to those in Study 1.
Comparisons across monetary amounts were obtained by analyzing the
percentage oered. Monetary (raw and percentage) and M&M oers were
included in separate four-factor ANOVAs, including two between subjects
factors, grades (sixth, ninth, and college) and gender (females and males), and
two repeated factors, information (partial and complete) and amounts (4, 5,
10, and 11 M&Ms; $1, $10, $30, $50, $100, $1000, and $1 million). Lowest
acceptable oers (responses) were analyzed in two three-factor analyses, one
including all three information conditions (no strings, partial, and complete)
but restricted to the $10 amount, the other including only the complete in-
formation condition but including all of the amounts.
3.1.4. Incentives
As noted, the sixth graders' school received a contribution for their par-
ticipation. In addition, three members from one college class won money
depending on one of their responses to the oers. After completing many
responses, three names were randomly chosen from the class roster and one
of each of their responses to oers of $100 or less was also randomly chosen.
That response determined their payo: if they accepted, they were paid the
amount oered; if they rejected it, they received nothing.
The two classes that did not respond to the no strings oers each had two
winners, one for their oers and responses and one for a set of utility
questions that were part of another study (Straub and Murnighan, 1995) not
reported here. In each case, the winners and one of their responses (of oers
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particular amount, they received it. If they had rejected it, they received
nothing. They knew this in advance. Although expected values for each re-
sponse were quite low (given the low probability that any single response
would be selected as a winner), awarded prizes ranged from a dime to $97.50.
Bolle (1990) reports that such lottery procedures led to no dierences from
other procedures that make smaller, direct payments to each respondent,
suggesting that this payo scheme is reasonable and eective. After a post
hoc questionnaire and the lottery, college students participated in a lengthy
debrie®ng discussion, as did the ninth grade classes.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Oers
The signi®cant eects from the ANOVAs for raw monetary oers and as a
percentage of the amount divided are shown in Table 1. Main eects indi-
cated that sixth graders oered more (on average, 43% of the amount they
were dividing) than ninth graders (37%) or college students (35%). Average
Table 1
Analysis of variance summaries for monetary oers for sixth and ninth graders and college students
Factor Raw oers % of Amt divided
df F p< F p<
Mixed model analyses
Grade 2,135 6.60 0.002 4.74 0.01
Gender 1,135 7.46 0.007 2.97 0.087
Information 1,135 32.86 0.001 43.30 0.001
Grade ´ Gender 2,135 1.09 ns 2.30 0.104
Grade ´ Info 2,135 1.67 0.193 5.17 0.007
Gender ´ Info 1,135 6.46 0.012 8.81 0.004
Grd ´ Gender ´ Info 2,135 0.24 ns 1.58 0.209
Multivariate analyses
Amount 7,129 208.53 0.001 3.89 0.001
Grade ´ Amount 14,260 1.98 0.019 2.09 0.013
Gender ´ Amount 7,129 2.33 0.028 1.61 0.137
Grade ´ Gender ´ Amt 14,260 0.82 ns 0.59 ns
Info ´ Amount 7,129 6.37 0.001 1.87 0.080
Grade ´ Info ´ Amt 14,260 1.27 0.227 0.87 ns
Gender ´ Info ´ Amt 7,129 2.56 0.152 0.70 ns
Grd ´ Gndr ´ Info ´ Amt 7.129 0.85 ns 0.74 ns
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be divided (43% versus 35% in the partial information conditions). Females
made larger oers than males, but only for raw and not for percentage oers,
due to the large amounts ($1 million) having a strong impact on the means,
supporting Hypothesis 3. The eect for amount divided for raw oers was
clearly a function of the manipulation. The more revealing eect was for the
percentage of the amount divided, which showed that the oered percentage
dropped as the amount increased.
The means and medians from the grade ´ information interaction for
percentage of the amount divided are shown in Table 2. Oers dropped and
strategic behavior (shading in the partial information conditions) increased
as the age of the respondents increased (particularly for the medians), sup-
porting Hypotheses 1 and 2 but not 1a.
The gender ´ information interaction for percentage oers indicates that,
like the third and sixth graders in Study 1, males shaded their oers more
than females. Across both gender and age groups, the median percentage
oer in the complete information conditions was 50%; in partial information,
females' median oer was 42.3% while males' was only 32.9%. As in Study 1,
these data support Hypothesis 3 in the partial information conditions.
Frequencies of fair, perfectly fair, and strategic monetary oerers indicate
that sixth grade girls were most often perfectly fair, as were sixth grade boys.
Ninth grade and college females were split between being fair or perfectly fair
and being strategic, and were more strategic as the amounts increased. Ninth
Table 2
Monetary oers (in percentages of the amount divided) by sixth and ninth graders and college students in
the information conditions
Grades Information
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pecially when the amounts were $10 or more. (The frequencies, for both
studies, are shown in Table 3.) These data also support Hypothesis 2.
Table 3




Study 1 Third Grade Sixth Grade
Females Males Females Males
1 Fair 6 3 2 2
Perfectly Fair 5 2 4 15
Strategic 8 16 6 6
Study 2 Sixth Grade Ninth Grade College
Females Males Females Males Females Males
1 Fair 2 4 1 3 1 0
Perf Fair 24 20 10 10 16 12
Strategic 1 9 8 10 8 8
5 Fair 4 3 1 2 1 1
Perf Fair 17 19 11 7 13 11
Strategic 4 11 7 14 11 8
10 Fair 2 3 2 1 0 0
Perf Fair 20 18 7 9 16 7
Strategic 4 12 10 13 9 13
30 Fair 6 2 2 2 2 3
Perf Fair 16 18 8 9 13 9
Strategic 4 12 9 12 10 8
50 Fair 3 3 2 3 0 2
Perf Fair 19 18 8 9 11 9
Strategic 4 12 9 12 14 9
100 Fair 3 3 2 3 3 1
Perf Fair 20 17 5 6 10 7
Strategic 4 12 12 14 12 12
1000 Fair 2 3 1 1 0 1
Perf Fair 18 18 8 7 11 8
Strategic 7 11 10 15 14 11
1 million Fair 3 1 2 1 2 0
Perf Fair 20 18 6 7 12 10
Strategic 4 14 11 14 11 10
432 J.K. Murnighan, M.S. Saxon / Journal of Economic Psychology 19 (1998) 415±445The information ´ amount and grade ´ amount interactions (see Tables 4
and 5) show that shading and the dierences between the grades increased as
the amounts increased. The median oers indicate that oerers did not shade
when they were oering one dollar, but they shaded about 10% for larger
amounts and increased shading to 20% for oers dividing $1 million. Sixth
graders' median oers (across both information conditions) were always half
of the amount to be divided; older students' median oers for amounts
greater than $1 were always less than half, with college students typically
oering somewhat less than ninth graders. This is more support for Hy-
pothesis 2.
Analysis of M&M oers for sixth and ninth grade children yielded
signi®cant eects for information (F(1,113)816.37, p < 0.001) and
Table 4





1 M 0.40 0.47
SD 0.18 0.13
Median 0.50 0.50
5 M 1.90 2.20
SD 0.79 0.63
Median 2.00 2.50
10 M 3.65 4.43
SD 1.85 1.38
Median 4.00 5.00
30 M 10.70 12.46
SD 5.86 4.13
Median 10.00 15.00
50 M 17.09 21.08
SD 9.52 7.19
Median 20.00 25.00
100 M 32.84 38.27
SD 20.33 44.16
Median 40.00 50.00
1000 M 308.69 409.88
SD 230.51 181.25
Median 400.00 500.00
1 million M 312,452 418,152
SD 295,699 228,468
Median 300,000 500,000
Note: n's ranged from 167 to 169.
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complete information led to larger oers than in the partial information
conditions, particularly with the larger amounts: oerers shaded M&Ms as
well as money.
3.2.2. Responses
Analysis of responses to $10 ultimatum oers yielded eects for infor-
mation (F(2,368)48.98, p < 0.001) and grade ´ information
(F(4,368)3.60, p < 0.005). The interaction (see Table 6) indicates little
dierence between the no strings and partial information conditions and a
clear increase in lowest acceptable oers with complete information, as in
previous studies. This supports Hypothesis 5. Sixth graders stated that they
Table 5





1 M 0.46 0.41 0.42
SD 0.12 0.15 0.13
Median 0.50 0.45 0.50
5 M 2.22 2.00 1.88
SD 0.52 0.61 0.64
Median 2.50 2.00 2.00
10 M 4.48 3.97 3.55
SD 1.22 1.43 1.49
Median 5.00 4.00 4.00
30 M 12.27 11.30 11.04
SD 4.07 4.38 4.63
Median 15.00 12.41 10.00
50 M 20.71 18.87 17.16
SD 6.28 7.71 7.15
Median 25.00 20.00 17.50
100 M 36.42 37.44 32.02
SD 39.65 14.87 14.91
Median 50.00 37.50 30.00
1000 M 426.04 349.80 285.38
SD 191.81 163.21 167.57
Median 500.00 387.50 300.00
1 million M 445,358 342,164 294,187
SD 205,685 246,521 211,333
Median 500,000 325,000 300,000
596n660 566n658 n49
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graders and college students, supporting Hypothesis 4.
Analysis of lowest acceptable oers across monetary amounts in complete
information yielded signi®cant eects for grade (F(2,125)15.18, p < 0.001)
and for grade ´ amount (F(2,244)4.11, p < 0.01). (See Table 7, for means
and medians.) As amounts increased, sixth graders required somewhat larger
oers than ninth graders who required considerably more than college stu-
dents, contrary to Hypothesis 4. Most college students showed a willingness
to take very small oers, especially when the amounts were large (e.g., they
accepted a median minimum oer of $100 when they knew that $1 million
was being divided).
The analysis of responses to M&M oers yielded one eect, for informa-
tion (F(1,16)16.00, p < 0.001). Sixth and ninth graders were willing to
accept fewer M&Ms (M1.80; median1.00) when they did not know how
many were being divided. They required more (M2.40; median2.00)
when they knew that 10 M&Ms were being divided, supporting Hypothesis 5.
Fewer respondents accepted one penny in this study, compared to Study 1.
Over both information conditions, sixth and ninth graders accepted one
penny about 20% of the time; for college students, it was only 9%. For
M&Ms, sixth graders accepted one 36% of the time and ninth graders ac-
cepted one 53% of the time. As with the younger children, one M&M was
accepted more frequently than one penny for sixth and ninth graders
(F(1,116)44.75, p < 0.001).
Table 6
Respondents' lowest acceptable oers (in dollars, Study 2)
Grade No Strings Partial Complete
Sixth
M 0.37 0.18 1.53
Median 0.04 0.10 0.50
n 59 55 56
Ninth
M 0.395 0.48 1.665
Median 0.01 0.05 1.00
n 58 52 55
College
M 0.42 0.51 1.12
Median 0.05 0.05 1.00
n 90 140 138
Note: Oerers divided $10, but this was only known to respondents in the complete information condition.
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As in Study 1, respondents were internally consistent: their responses to
M&M and monetary oers were highly correlated; all 12 correlations were
signi®cant (0.18 < r < 0.87, p < 0.05). Correlations among and between
monetary and M&M oers were also strong, with 227 of 253 signi®cant. Like
the results for younger children, overall correlations between responses and
oers were low, with only 22 of 106 signi®cant. For sixth and ninth graders,
the correlations were not signi®cant ()0.216r60.29). But for college stu-
dents, the relationships were all positive and tended to be signi®cant
(0.336r60.44; n140). Thus, the younger groups were not particularly
consistent when they shifted from being respondents to oerers, but college
students were.
Analysis of the sixth graders' responses and oers in the two studies
yielded only one signi®cant eect: they required larger partial information
oers on the questionnaires (Mean18.2 cents) than they did when they
responded one-on-one [Mean5.81 cents; F(1,91)6.92, p < 0.01].
Table 7
Older respondents' lowest acceptable oers (in dollars) for complete information conditions only
(percentages in parentheses)
Amount divided ($) Grade
Sixth Ninth College
10 M 1.53 (15.3) 1.67 (16.7) 1.12 (11.2)
SD 1.90 1.92 1.46
Median 0.50 (5.0) 1.00 (10.0) 1.00 (10.0)
30 M 8.19 (27.3) 7.75 (25.8) 3.62 (12.1)
SD 6.68 6.29 4.81
Median 5.00 (16.7) 10.00 (33.3) 1.50 (5.0)
50 M 17.10 (34.2) 14.77 (29.5) 8.01 (16.0)
SD 12.58 11.39 8.60
Median 20.00 (40.0) 15.00 (30.0) 4.75 (9.5)
100 M 40.29 (40.3) 34.05 (34.0) 18.05 (36.1)
SD 25.55 23.71 17.95
Median 50.00 (50.0) 40.00 (40.0) 12.00 (24.0)
1000 M 362.59 (36.3) 320.35 (32.0) 74.09 (7.4)
SD 272.01 272.33 136.34
Median 500.00 (50.0) 400.00 (40.0) 15.00 (0.15)
1 million M 283,994 (28.4) 150,453 (15.0) 44,253 (4.4)
SD 303,863 215,672 123,865
Median 200,000 (20.0) 4,000 (0.4) 100 (0.01)
526n659 526n658 n49
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procedures in the two studies, the fact that questionnaire respondents had
seen larger amounts (i.e., questions asking them whether they would accept
amounts up to $5 in the no strings condition) while face-to-face respondents
were asked whether they would accept smaller oers in ascending order (1
cent, 2 cents, etc.) may have contributed to this dierence.
3.3. Discussion
The results from Study 2 provide a bridge from the ®ndings of Study 1 to
previous research on adults. They help identify some of the developmental
dierences in ultimatum bargaining between the two samples of dierent
ages, particularly due to the strength of the results in Study 2.
Hypothesis 5 was strongly supported again (see Table 8), this time for both
dollars and M&Ms. This suggests that the acceptance of small partial in-
formation oers is quite robust.
Hypothesis 4 led to outcomes that were dierent for money and M&Ms,
and for partial and complete information. While sixth graders reported being
willing to accept fewer M&Ms and less money in the $10 complete infor-
mation condition than ninth graders or college students, they were less
willing to accept small oers when higher amounts were being divided. These
results raise issues concerning potentially dierent perceptions of these two
commodities and of the dierent monetary amounts. Although the ®ndings
Table 8
Evaluation of the hypotheses in the two studies
Hypotheses Study 1 Study 2




Strong support ($$) No
evidence (M&Ms)
1a. More generous oers by
older children
6th grade males ($$) No
evidence (M&Ms)
Exactly the reverse ($$) No
evidence (M&Ms)
2. Strategic oers increase
with age
No clear support ($$ and
M&Ms)
Strong support ($$) No
evidence (M&Ms)
3. Larger oers by girls For 5 & 11 M&Ms Partial
information ($$)
For raw oers and Partial
information ($$)
4. Smaller oers accepted by
younger children
Some support (kindergartners) Mixed support ($$ and M&Ms)
5. Smaller oers accepted in
partial information
Strong support ($$) Strong support ($$ and M&Ms)
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accept one penny or one M&M less often than the younger respondents in
Study 1. Thus, the results for Hypothesis 4 continue to be mixed.
Hypothesis 3 found similar support in both studies. As before, sixth and
ninth grade girls tended to oer more than boys, particularly in the partial
information condition. Clearly, females take less strategic advantage of in-
formation asymmetries than males, across all ages studied here.
Hypothesis 2 was strongly supported for monetary oers: strategic be-
havior did increase with age. This was particularly true for college students
whose behaviors as oerers and respondents were correlated. Since college
students reported thinking that their peers were willing to accept small oers
(as most of them were), then they could eectively oer them less, especially
when respondents did not know how much was being oered. While third
grade boys in Study 1 seemed to also grasp the possibility for strategic be-
havior, the increase in strategic behavior with age is particularly apparent in
Study 2. It may be that the consistency that seems to come with age is nec-
essary for this eect to fully appear.
With this older set of oerers, Hypothesis 1a received no support, while
Hypothesis 1, which posited that younger children would make more equal
oers, was strongly supported (again, only for dollars). Sixth graders, par-
ticularly sixth grade girls, were most likely to make 50±50 oers, and this
tendency dissipated with age and increasing monetary amounts.
4. General discussion
The data from these two studies provide a ®rst step in the investigation of
the development of bargaining behavior in ultimatum games. Starting with
kindergartners, we observe a number of dierent behaviors, including their
seeming inability to refuse oers of one M&M, their apparent generosity
when making oers of coins or M&Ms, and no evidence of guile or strategic
behavior whatsoever. Our youngest participants were the only ones to give all
of the money or the candy away. This may have re¯ected altruism (e.g.,
``because he doesn't have much''); it may also represent a dierent script,
since at least two children said that they gave everything to the other child
``so he wouldn't bother me.'' This ®ts the underlying notions of the model of
justice by Damon (1980) (although his model predicted equal splits). At the
same time, it provides a foundation for interpreting the behavior of the older
children.
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oerers when they were dividing money but they were extremely fair when
they were oering or responding to M&M oers. Boys and girls revealed
dierent kinds of strategies as well, with boys being blatantly more strategic
with monetary oers and girls being subtly more generous with M&M oers,
oering more than half when they were dividing odd numbers of candies.
Sixth grade boys, in contrast, did not follow the trend established by third
graders: few of their monetary oers were strategic (although these few were
extremely strategic); instead most tended to be perfectly fair, making 50±50
oers. This represents a developmental discontinuity in the data: either the
third grade boys in this sample were more strategic than might be expected or
sixth grade boys were more generous. The data from Study 2 suggests that
the former may be the more appropriate interpretation, since the format
change from Study 1 to Study 2 led to almost no dierences in sixth graders'
behavior. In fact, a relatively smooth trend across ages was quite strong in
Study 2. Especially for the larger amounts of money, sixth graders indicated
that oers needed to be larger to be acceptable, larger than those demanded
by ninth graders or college students. At the same time, they oered more.
Only the college students showed any tendency to be consistent across the
two roles of oerer and respondent; they were also the only participants to
express a willingness to accept very small oers.
Tests of the hypotheses indicated that, in general, younger children oered
more and accepted less than older children or adults. Most kindergartners
did not reject either one penny or one M&M. In addition, with increasing
age, respondents other than college students appeared less willing to accept
low oers.
Girls were consistent across both studies, oering more than boys in the
partial information conditions. They also tended to be fair or perfectly fair
more often than males. When they did act strategically, they were only
moderately strategic, shading their oers only slightly.
The acceptance of small oers by younger respondents, Hypothesis 4,
received mixed support in both studies. Kindergartners accepted one penny
and one M&M more than older children, and acceptances of one penny and
one M&M tended to decrease with age (although third graders accepted less
than expected). Sixth graders in Study 2 accepted less than older respondents
in the complete information conditions when monetary amounts were small,
but not when amounts were large. Thus, the data for acceptances may
warrant additional investigation. (This is also true for adult populations as a
whole.)
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the partial information conditions. When no information was available about
the amount to be divided and respondents could not know how much oerers
would bene®t, respondents tended to accept very small amounts. These
®ndings replicate previous ®ndings and show robust support for the sub-
game-perfect predictions for many age groups in partial information condi-
tions.
The fact that our respondents tended to accept oers of one M&M more
often than oers of one penny suggests that respondents evaluated them quite
dierently. Their emotional reactions when the game switched to M&Ms
were quite clear: they were much more physically active and smiled more
when they knew that the currency had changed to M&Ms. Thus, future re-
search might investigate whether immediately disposable, attractive com-
modities like M&Ms lead people to act as if anything is clearly better than
nothing.
4.1. Limitations and future research
Since this study was not conducted longitudinally, the observed dierences
may not re¯ect true developmental dierences. In addition, the payos may
have been conceptualized dierently by the older and younger participants.
Constraints by administrators and the risk of contaminating future respon-
dents made it impossible to provide direct incentives to anyone except the
college students. And, ®nally, we could not counter-balance the order of
conditions (e.g., all coin oers preceded M&M oers in Study 1). This re-
duced the strength of the design but ensured that the participants attended
directly to the task.
These limitations should lead to cautious conclusions. At the same time,
the studies provide the ®rst data that we know of on these issues. As such,
they provide the groundwork for additional research. In particular, the no-
tion that third grade boys were obviously strategic (one asked the experi-
menter before making his oer, ``Now, he doesn't know what this amount is,
right?'') when they were dividing money warrants additional investigation.
Whether this ®nding can be replicated, whether it might originate earlier
(with ®rst or second graders, at ages 7 or 8), how it relates to other abilities
(e.g., computational) or values, and why it appears for money and not
M&Ms are all open questions. The more general question concerning the
apparent inconsistencies across commodities also suggests the need for ad-
ditional research ± especially since, unlike sixth graders, ninth graders ap-
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the inconsistencies of sixth grade boys' monetary and M&M oers may re-
¯ect one stage in a developing trend.
Many third graders exercised the most stringent fairness criteria we ob-
served in this study. Most made only 50±50 M&M oers, regardless of the
information condition, and 13 of 40 third graders rejected oers that favored
the other person and oers that favored themselves. They upheld an extreme
standard for fairness even when oerers freely asked for less than they of-
fered. This set of third graders more than supported the observations of
Damon (1980) for 5- to 7-year-olds, i.e., tended to often no more and no less
than 50±50 for both bargainers. At approximately 9 years of age, however,
they were older than predicted by the model of Damon (1980). Instead, they
are in line with the early results of Handlon and Gross (1959).
This result also suggests that strategic bargaining by young boys may be
restricted to monetary negotiations. The qualitative dierences between
money and M&Ms were highlighted by the fact that, for every age group,
more respondents accepted oers of one M&M than oers of one penny, in
both the complete and partial information conditions. (Of a total of 241
respondents, 98 (41%) accepted 1 penny in the partial information condi-
tions; 134 (56%) accepted one M&M. For complete information, 62 (26%)
accepted one cent; 104 (43%) accepted one M&M.)
The sixth and ninth graders' behaviors approximated but were less extreme
than those of the college students in many ways. Sixth graders were less
willing to accept low oers and both sixth and ninth graders made higher
oers than college students. There were two other noteworthy dierences
among the older groups. First, college students said that they were willing, on
average, to accept extremely low oers as respondents; this more than oset
the drop in their own oers as the amounts to be divided increased. And
second, unlike all the younger participants, their oers and responses were
signi®cantly correlated.
While the younger participants oered more and accepted less, the only
adults in these studies, college students, oered less and accepted even less
than the younger respondents. This shift, and the internally consistent oer
and response behavior of the college students, suggests the possibility of a
qualitative shift between ninth grade and college, at least in this sample. In
particular, college students moved closer to matching the predictions of
economic theory, oering less and accepting less, even with complete infor-
mation. For them, reductions in oers were matched by reductions in what
they were willing to accept. This suggests a distinct relaxation of the stringent
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may be willing to accept much less than half, especially as the amount to be
divided increases. And even these numbers may be in¯ated, since people's
ability to reject large amounts of real money (e.g., sixth graders who said they
would reject $300 or more when $1000 is being divided) is clearly open to
question.
Alternative explanations for this apparent shift to consistency by college
students include the possibility that they may be less aected by and less
prone to quick emotional reactions. Recent research by Frank et al. (1993)
also suggests another explanation: that college students have had the chance
to study economics and, as a result, have become more consistent in their
bargaining strategies: note in this context that the subjects in the present
experiment were involved in a management class. These possibilities open
doors for future research.
The results are also consistent with the notion that children become more
competitive as they get older (e.g., Toda et al., 1978). It may be that chil-
dren's increasing competitiveness is fueled by a concomitant increase in
strategic behavior, which allows them to achieve their competitive goals (i.e.,
to do better than the other person).
Straub and Murnighan (1995) found that small amounts of money (e.g.,
less than a quarter or 50 cents) were almost meaningless to many respondents
(since ``they wouldn't work in a parking meter or a soda machine''). Some
children also refused very small amounts of money (e.g., a penny or two). As
one third grade boy, who rejected the oer of a penny, put it: ``You can't buy
anything with a penny. It's not going to do you a lot of good, unless you save
up your pennies, which could take a very long time, because it takes 25 to
equal a quarter.'' He rejected 2, 3, 4, and 5 cents as well, but accepted 10,
saying ``You can buy a piece of candy with 10 cents.'' Thus, even when
people did reject small amounts of money, it may have been because they
judged the amounts to be subjectively (rather than objectively) meaningless.
Economic models rarely address the behavior of children. But the con-
tinued support found here for Hypothesis 5 suggests that subgame-perfect
predictions are also applicable in partial information conditions for very
young respondents. As children get older, as they know how much is being
divided, or if they are making rather than responding to ultimatum oers,
however, they provide much less support for the subgame-perfect predic-
tions.
Like adults, children rejected small, complete information oers and of-
fered more than small amounts. This same third grade boy oered an ex-
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made a partial information oer dividing $1, he oered 50 cents and ex-
plained: ``Then it would be 50±50. Both of us would have 50 cents.'' When he
made a similar oer that was complete information, he said, ``25 cents. No,
60 cents, because sometimes I like to give people some more than I got. Some
I let them have all of it, and I just keep what I have. Sometimes money
doesn't matter; it depends on what I feel.''
These quotes are included to show that, while children increasingly shape
their behaviors to match those of adults, they start with a broad base of
reactions, some economic and some concerning fairness. More research on
how these two concerns develop and how they aect bargaining behavior and
other interactions certainly seems warranted. We hope that the research re-
ported here can provide some of the early groundwork for both theoretical
and empirical advances in this area.
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